Department of Evidence by Editors,
STATEMEiT OV THE CASE .
telegram was intended to secure, are
among the natural consequences of
the delay, those for'which, under
the first part of that rule, the corn-
'paty would be liable without re-
* gard to its knowledgeof the mean-
ing of the. message, 'and that the"
probability of. such consequences
* is not a special circumstance re-
quiring to be known, by the com-
any. In'theFlorida and-Georgia
cases, however, the rule in Hadley
v. Baxendale. seems, to.beregarded
as wholly inapplicable, while in
* Virginia the statutory liability of
telegraph companies is held to he
independent of their knowledge of
the meaning of messages. , -
The practical applicati6n of the
doctrines above reviewed involves.
a consideration of the right of tele-
graph companies to limit their lia-
bility to cases where messages are
repeated or specially insured, but
such a consideration would exceed.
the space assigned to the present
-note.
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UNION PAcIFIc RAIIWAY Co. V; BOTSFORD. " - "SUPREMZ
COURT OF THE UNITtD STATFS.
" A court of the United'States, in an action for in injury to the person,
cannot, on application of the defendant, compel the plaintiff to submit
- to a physical examination in advance of the trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..
Error to the Circuit Court of the' United States for the
District of Indiana.
This was an action by the appellee, Clara L. Botsford,
against the appellant, for negligence in the construction.
and care of an upper berth in a sleeping, car in which she
was a passenger, by reason of which the berth fell upon
- her head, bruising and wounding her, rupturing the mem-
branes of the brain and spinal cord, and causing .a concus-
1 141 U. S., "50.
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sion of the same, and resulting in great suffering and pain
to her in body and mind, and in permanent and increasing
injuries. Answer, a general denial.
Three days before the trial (as appeared by the defend-
ant's bill of exceptions) "the defendant moved the Court
for an order against the plaintiff, requiring her to submit
to a surgical examination, in the -presence of her surgeon
and attorneys, if she desired their presence; it being pro-
posed by the defendant that such examination should be
made in manner not to expose the person of the defendant
in any indelicate manner, the defendant at the time inform-
ing the Court that such examination was necessary to
enable a correct diagnosis of the case, and that without
such examination the defendant would be without any wit-
nesses as to her condition. The Court overruled said
motion, and refused to make such order, upon the sole
ground that this Court had no legal right or power to make
and enforce such order."
To this rtling and action of the Court, the defendant
duly excepted, and after a trial, at which the plaintiff and
other witnesses testified in her behalf, and which resulted
in a verdict and judgment for her in the sum of $IO,OOO,
sued out this writ of error. The Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Court below.
THE POWER OF A COURT TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF IN ACCIDENT CASE
TO SUBMIT TO PHYSICAL EXAMINATION.
The principal case presented to
the Supreme Court of the United
States for the first time a question
concerning the inherent powers of
courts about which there had al-
ready been, in the courts of the
several States, a considerable vari-
ance of opinion. The precise ques-
tion was whether, in a civil action
for an injury to the person, the
Court, on application of the de-
fendant, could compel the plaintiff
to submit to physical examination
in advance of the trial. Justice
GRAY, by whom the judgment of
the Court was delivered, after a
characteristically exhaustive in-
quiry and research, pronounces the
conclusion to be that neither by
the common law, by common
usage, nor by the statutes of the
United States, has a Court of the
United States the power to subject
a party to examination by a sur-
geon, without his consent, and in
advance of the trial. A dissenting
opinion, in which Justice BROWN
concurred, was filed by Justice
BREVER.
The decisions throughout the
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country, on the point involved, are
much in conflict; but, in general;
it may be said that the numerical
weight of opinion in the, State
courts is against the view taken in
the principal case. Particularly
in the southern and western States,
the doctrine that courts have an
inherent power to grant such a
compulsory order has been exten-
sively adopted. That there is a
giowing tendency in favor of the
* recognition of the existence of
such an inherent right and power
cannot be doubted; but that the
weight of precedent and authority
is in support of the position, may
well be questioned.
'The closest analogy to be found
in the common law is probably
,afforded by the ancient appeal of
mayhem (abolished in x719); for
there, when the issue joined was
whether it was mayhem or no may-
* hem, the question- was decided by
th Court upon inspection, for
which purpose Blai~kstone tells us,
the assistance of surgeons might
be -invoked. The trial by inspec-
tion or examination was likewise
had for the determination of such
questions at the infancy or the
identity of a party. It is, however,
very properly pointed out by Jus-
• tice GRAY that always where trial
by inspection was allowed, it took
the form, not of a precedent aux-
iliary to a jury, by whom the result
was subsequently to be finally ad-
judicated, but as a complete sub-
stitution for any jury whatsoever;
and that it obtained only in excep-
tional cases, where, as Blackstone
says, "It was not thought neces-
sary to summon a jury to decide,"
because "the fact,.from its nature,
must be evident to the Court, either
from ocular demonstrationi or
other irrefragable proof;" and,
therefore, "the law departs from
its usual resort, the verdief of
twelve. men, and relies on the judg-
ment of the Court alone."
The writ de ventreinspiciendo at
common law likewise presents
somewhat of an analogy to the
compulsory examination sought in
the principal case. This, however,
no less than the trial by inspection
in the instances above nimed, was
employed only to subserve some
exceptional or unusual exigency ;
as, in criminal cases, to guard
against destroying an innocent life,
' where a woman, convicted of a
capital crime, was suspected to be
'quick with: child; or, in matters of
purely civil right,- to secure the
rightful succetsion to property; for
where a widow was suspected to
feign herself with child in order to
produce asupposititious beir to the
estate, the heir -or devisee might
have this writ to examine whether
she was with child or not.
If it should seem, from this in-
stance of the writ de ventre inspi-
ciendo, as is contended by Justices
BRBwBR and BROwN in their dis-
senting opinion, that always where.
the interests of justice seemed to
require a personal examination, the
power of the common law courts to
compel such an examination war
exercised, it is not to be forgotten
that the exigency which induced
the writ was required to be one of
peculiar necessity and urgency; and
that even in England, as remarked
by Justice GRAY. in all the history
of the common law courts no order
to inspect the body of a party in a
personal action appears ever to
have been moved for, much less
granted. If the power existed it is
inconceivable that it should not
ha-Ve been frequently invoked.
Actions for assault and battery,
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and for personal torts, generally, it
need hardly be said, were among
the most common known; while in
no case does it appear that the in-
herent power of the courts in this
regard was ever claimed or even
supposed. The writ de venlre
inspiciendo has issued in England
in comparatively recent times: In
re Blakemore, 14 Law Journal
(N. S.), Ch. 336 (1845). In America,
on the other hand, there seems to
be no instance of its ever having
been considered in any part of the
country as suited to the habits and
conditions of the people.
The authority of courts, in actions
for divorce proceeding on the
ground of impotency or sexual in-
capacity, to make an 9rder subject-
ing a party to physical examination,
is plainly' referable to the civil and
canon law, and is in no wise accord-
ing to the course of the common
law. It rests also, as is remarked
by Justice GRAY, upon the interest
which the public, no less than the
parties, have in the question of
upholding or dissolving the mar-
riage state.
If the common law, as thus far
investigated, fails to disclose any
colorable support to the doctrine of
crompulsory physical examination
by the courts, it is still further to
be remembered with how great
respect and solicitude the common
law guards the native right of every
individual to [the possession and
control of his own person, free
from all restraintor interference by
others, unless by clear and unques-
tionable authority of law. This
right has been well said to be a
right "of'complete immunity," a
right "to bellet alone:" Cooley on
Torts, 29. "Inviolability of the
person," says Justice GRAY, "is as
much invaded by a compulsory
stripping and exposure as by a
blow. To compel anyone, espe-
cially a woman, to lay bare the
body or to submit-it to the touch of
a stranger, without lawful authority,
is an indignity, an assault, and a
trespass." If it should seem incon-
sistent (as the dissenting justices in
their opinion declare it does) that
a plaintiff may in the presence of a
jury be permitted to roll up his
sleeve and disclose on his arm a
wound of which he testifies; but
when he testifies as to the existence
of such wounds, the court, although
persuaded that he is perjuring
himself, cannot require him to
roll up his sleeve and thus make
manifest the truth, the answer
should seem to be that while any-
one, with the permission of the
Court, and with a due regard for
decency, may expose his body if he
will, yet that it.is impossible that
he can be comfielled to'do so-in a
civil action, without his consent.
.Unquestionably, if he unreasonably
refuses to show his injuries when.
asked so to do, then, as in any
other case of a party declining to
produce the best evidence in his
power, that fact may be considered
by the julry as bearing on his good
faith.
In general, it may be said of the
opinion of the Court as delivered
byJustice GRAY, and of the dissent-
ing opinion as filed by Justices
BREVWR and BROWN, that while
the former is characterized by a
tendency to uphold the considera-
tions of delicacy which support the
doctrine of the inviolability of the
person at common law, the latter
is distinguished by what may be
the modern tendency throughout
the country rather to relax or sub-
ordinate refined considerations of
the sanctity of the person to the
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attainment of an occasional more
exact and impartial acninistration
of justice.
In the State courts, the question
of the power to order an inspection
-of the body of the plaintiff in an
action for personal injury was first
presented in 1868 before a judge of
the New York Superior Court, at
special term, in Walsh v. Sayre, 52
How. Pr., 334, who affirmed the
existence of the power; a decision,
however, which was subsequently
overruled in general term: Roberts
v. Ogdensburgh, etc., Railroad, 29
Hun., 154. In 1873, in Missouri,
and in 1882, in Illinois (Parker v.
Enslow, 102 Ill., 272), the power
of the Court to make such an order
was peremptorily denied, the Court
in Loyd v. Railroad, 53 Mo., 509,
saying: " The proposal of the Court
to call in two surgeons and have
the plaintiff examined during the
progress of the trial as to the ex-
tent of her injuries, is unknown to
our practice and to the law." In
1877, -howevef, the Supreme Court
of Iowa, in Shroeder v. Railroad,
47- Iowa, 375, led off with the doc-
trine of the discretionary power of
the courts in this regard; since
which time, following her lead,
the courts of the southern and
western States have gradually
announced the same doctrine:
Turnpike Co. v. Baily, 37 Ohio,
1o4; Hatfield v. St. Paul, etc.,
Railroad, 33 Minn., 130; Owens v.
Kansas City, etc., Railroad, 95 Mo.,
169; Stuart v. Havens, 17 Neb., 211;
Atchison, etc., Railroad v. Thul, 29
Kan., 466; White v. Milwaukee
Railway, 61 Wis., 536.
In the Iowa case, Shroeder v.
Railroad, supra, the Court said:
"Whoever is a party to an- action
in a court .... has a right to de-
mand therein the administration
of exact justice. This right can
only be secured and thoroughly re-
spected by obtaining the exact and
full trtith touching all matters in
issue in 'the action. ... . It quite
satisfactorily appears . . . that the
full effect of the injuries and the
extent of the plaintiffs disability
could be determined by physicians
and surgeons upon an examination
of the body of the plaintiff. ....
The decided, indeed, the very great
preponderance of the evidence
offered, apart from, his own testi-
mony, was to the effect that the
injuries had wtought no such
effects as claimed by plaintiff..
'To our minds the .proposition is
plain that a proper examination by
learned and skillful physicians and
surgeonswould have opened a rbad
- by which the case could have been
conducted nearer to exact justice
than in any other vay. The plain-
tiff, as it were, had under his own
control testimony which would
have revealed the truth more
clearly than any other that could
have been introduced. The cause
of truth, the right admininistration
of the law, demand that he should
have produced- it. . . . It is the
practice of the courts of this State
to permit plaintiffs who sue for
personal injuries to exhibit to the
jury their wounds or injured limbs
in order to show the extent of their
disability or suffering.' If for this
purpose the plaintiff may exhibit
his injuries, we see no reason why
he may not in a proper case and
under proper 'circumstances be re-
quired to do the same thing for a
like purpose upon the request of
the other party."
In Georgia, the power of the
Court to order a physical examina-
tion, in the sound discretion of the
presiding judge, is distinctly as-
serted: Richmond, etc., Railroad
v. Childress, 82 Ga., 719. The
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Court say: "It can certainly ad-
mit of no doubt that, in a proper
case for such an examination, the
cause of justice would be subserved
by it. . . . As to the sugges-
tion made in argument that the
rule would operate hardly upon
delicate and modest females, we
can only say that this would be
safely guarded by the discretion of
the trial judge. There would be no
danger, we think, in this country,
of an examination being ordered
needlessly, or where an improper
shock to modesty or feelings of
delicacy would be likely."
In Alabama, etc., Railroad v.
Hill, 9o Ala., 71, the Court say:
"WThen it becomes a question of
possible violation to the refined
and delicate feelings of the plain-
tiff on the one hand, and possible
injustice to the defendant on the
other, the law cannot hesitate; jus-
tice must be done. . . . We
are satisfied from the evidence that
such an examination would not
have involved any ill consequences
to the plaintiff."
In Indiana it is held (Pennsyl-
vania Co. v. Newmeyer, 28 N. R.
Rep., 86o), that in the absence of a
statute the Court has no power to
order an examination.
In Illinois, as has been said, it
was declared, in 1882 (Parker v.
Enslow, 102 Ill., 272), that the
Court had no power to compel an
examination. In Chicago, etc.,
Railroad v. Holland, 122 Ill., 461
(1887), however, such power in the
Court appears to-be recognized, the
decision proceeding on the ground
that as the defendant, after refusal
of the Court below, had ample
opportunity to make an examina-
tion by its own physician, there
was no .ground for complaint. See
St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Miller, 28
N. E. Rep., lO91.
In Arkansas, where the plaintiff
alleges that his injuries are of a per-
manent nature, the defendant is de-
clared to be entitled, as a matter
of right, to have the opinion of
surgeons based upon a personal ex-
amination, unless there is already
an abundance of expert evidence,
in which case the Court will use its
discretion: Sibley v. Smith, 46
Ark., 275.
In Texas it is ruled that such an
order will never be made unless the
"ends of justice seem imperatively
to demand it, and never where the
party is willing to be examined by
competent and disinterested men
without such an order: Gulf, etc.,
Railrpad v. Norfieet, 78 Tex., 321.
See Missouri Pacific Railroad v.
Johnson, 72 Tex., 95.
In New York, on the other
hand, in McGuigan v. Railroad,
129 N. Y., 50 (189I), the Court say:
"It is a significant fact that not a
trace can be found in the decisions
of the common law courts either
before or since the Revolution of
the exercise of the power to com-
pel a party to a personal action to
submit his person to an examina-
tion at the instance of the other
party. . . . The non-existence
of a power is not conclusive against
its existence, but it is strange if the
power existed that it should have
been unused for centuries and
never have been called into activity.
The power to compel a
party to submit to an examination
of his person has never been con-
ferred by statute. We cannot say
that the exercise of the power might
not in some cases promote justice
and prevent fraud. On the other
hand, unless carefully guarded, it
would be subject to grave objec-
tions. But we have to deal only
with the question of the power of
the courts, in the absence of legis-
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lation. It is very clear that the
power-is not a part of the recog-
nized and customary jurisdiction
of courts of law or equity. The
doctrine that courts have an in-
herent jurisdiction to mould the
proceedings to meet new conditions
and exigencies- is true, but in a
limited sense. They cannot, un-
der cover of procedure, or to ac-
complish justice in a particular
case, invade recognized rights of
person or property. . . The
exercise by the Court of the power
now invoked, as has been shown,
is not sanctioned by any usage in
the courts of-England or of this
State. Its existence is not indis-
pensable to the due administration
of justice. Its exercise depending
•on the discretion of the judge,
would be subject to great abuse.
We think the assumption by the
courts of this jurisdiction, in the
absvnce of statutbry authority,
would be an arbitrary extension of
its pbwers. It is a just inference
that an alleged power which had
lain dormant during the whole
period of English jurisprudence,
and never attempted to be exercised
in America until within a very
recent period, never in facthad any
existence."
In Pennsylvania, in 188o, in in.
aciior by a dentist for the price of
a set of teeth furnished to defend-
ant's wife, where the defence was
that the teeth did not fit, the Court
of Comthon Pleas, No. 4, of Phila-
delphia County, dismissed amotion
f6r 'a rule to show cause why an
order of court should not be made
requiring the defendant to produce
his wife for the inspection of her
mouth by the jury, THAYER, P. J.,
saying: "The compulsory attend-
ance of the wife for the purpose of
such an exhibition would be a tyran-
nical exercise of power wholly
without authority of law, and con-
trary to t6e Bill of Rights: ' Pettit-
v., Brewer, 8 W..N. C., 253. In 1888,
however, the Court of Common
Pleas, No. 2, of the same county,
in an action for injuries to the per-
son, required the plaintiff to file a
bill of particulars, from which the
necessity for ordering a physical
examination might first be made to
appear: Lawrence v. Keim, 45 Leg.
Int., 434; and where, in Common
Pleas, No. i, the bill of particulars
failed to state the injuries with
sufficient definiteness, a physical
- examination was ordered: Harvey
v. Traction Co., 26 W. N. C., 231
(I89O). physical examination
was also, in I89o, ordered in Erie
.County: Hess v. Iake Shore, etc.;'
R. R-, 7 Pa. County Rep., 565. See
Johnson v. Com., 115 Pa., 369.
The numerical *eight of opinion
throughout the country, as has
.been said, is against the view taken
in the principal case. It is to be
remarked, howeveTr, that while the
courts have been strenuous in as-
serting the existence of the power,
the instances where its exercise
has been held to be necessary have
been notably infrequent. Merely
to say, as, the majority of the de-
cisions do, that the power rests in
the sound discretion of the Court,
obviously does not meet the case.
The real question lemains whether
the power exists at all. If it be
said that plaintiffs may exaggerate
ihe injuries they have received,
it may be "this evil is far less than
the adoption of a system of bodily
and, perhaps, immodest examina-
tions, which might deter many,
especially women, from ever com-
mencing actions, however great the
injustice they had sustained:"
Roberts v. Ogdensburgh, etc., Rail-
road, 29 Hun. (N. Y.), 154.
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